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Abstract 
Given the “normal value” of a product as common knowledge in an import-competing market, the profitability of a 
home firm in filing an antidumping (AD) petition against its foreign rival is shown to depend on the marginal cost 
differential between the home and foreign firms. When the marginal cost differential is “significantly large,” the home 
firm's ability to put the foreign firm at the risk of an AD violation is limited. But when the marginal cost differential is 
“significantly small,” the home firm is able to increase its output and lower the price of the product below its normal 
value, putting the foreign firm in the situation of an illegal dumping. One interesting implication is that, relative to the 
case without an AD law, the home firm has a stronger incentive to undertake cost-reducing activities (e.g., R&D 
investment or the adoption of a more efficient technology) under the law.
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1.  Introduction 
Dumping arises when a foreign firm sells product at a price below its “normal value” in the 
home market.  Dumping as a strategy for exporting countries in international markets and 
antidumping (AD) policy as an instrument for restricting imports have been studied extensively 
in the trade literature.
1  The World Trade Organization (WTO) allows governments of member 
countries to take actions against dumped imports in order to protect their domestic industries.   
In this paper, we present a simple duopolistic model to analyze the economic incentive of 
a home firm in filing petition for an AD investigation, taking into account output interactions 
between the firm and its foreign rival in the home country’s market under an AD law.
2  Given the 
“normal value” of an imported product as common knowledge (Evenett, 2006), we show that 
whether the foreign firm is accused of violating an AD law depends on differences in marginal 
costs between the home and foreign firms.  When the home firm is relatively inefficient in 
production, its ability to put a foreign firm at the risk of an AD charge by lowering the market 
price through an increase in output is rather limited.  But this result changes when the marginal 
cost differential is “significantly small” and the home firm is capable of increasing its production.  
In this case, the increase in domestic production may cause the price of the product to fall below 
its normal value, with the result that the foreign firm violates an AD law.      
The analysis with this paper may help identify the conditions under which a domestic 
firm finds it profitable to file an AD petition against its foreign rival or whether the foreign firm 
can successfully avoid an AD charge.  In other words, the analysis shows possible types of 
domestic firms that tend to file petition against foreign firms of illegal dumping.  Not 
surprisingly, these are domestic firms that are relatively efficient in production or those firms 
whose market shares are large relative to their foreign competitors. 
Collie and Vandenbussche (2006) analyze the incentive for U.S. industries to file an AD  
petition under the Byrd Amendment when domestic industries alleging harm receive a   
share of the duty rent.   The authors show that if the U.S. government puts a sufficiently   
large weight on domestic profits in social welfare, an industry has a strong   
incentive to file petition for an AD investigation when its market share exceeds 50%.  In our 
paper, we show that Collie and Vandenbussche’s (2006) finding carries over to the   
traditional case of an AD law without redistributing the duty revenue to domestic industries.  In 
our simple model with the traditional AD law, we find condition under which adjustments in 
domestic production can put a foreign firm into an AD violation.  This condition arises when the 
marginal cost differential between home and foreign firms is significantly low and the market 
share of the home firm exceeds 50%.  Our finding is consistent with an interesting observation 
by Collie and Vandenbussche (2006) that, according to U.S. data on AD cases for 1980-1995, the 
average market share of U.S. firms that filed petitions was as high as 67%.
3 
One interesting implication of our analysis is that, compared to the case without an AD 
                                                 
1 For studies on dumping and countervailing tariffs under the traditional antidumping law, see, e.g., Dixit (1988), 
Anderson (1992, 1993), Prusa (1992, 1994), Reitzes (1993), Marvel and Ray (1995), and Gao and Miyagiwa (2005).  
For issues related to administered protection and the political economy of antidumping, see, e.g., Finger, Hall, and 
Nelson (1982), Irwin (2004), and Nelson (2006). Stiglitz (1997) contains a review of the U.S. import laws including 
the AD and countervailing measures. 
2 We consider the traditional antidumping law under which AD duties are collected by the importing country’s 
treasure as revenue.  For other issues on AD such as the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act implemented 
by U.S. government under which the revenue from AD fines are redistributed to domestic firms alleging harm,  see, 
for example, Chang and Gayle (2006), Collie and Vandenbussche (2006), Evenett (2006). 
3 The data sets in Collie and Vandenbussche (2006) can be found at: http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruce/adpage.   2
law, a domestic firm has a stronger incentive to undertake cost-reducing activities (e.g., R&D 
investment or the adoption of a more efficient technology) under the law.  By reducing the 
marginal cost differential via such activities, the domestic firm is able to increase its output and 
lower the market price of the product below the normal value, putting its foreign competitor in 
the situation of a dumping violation.  However, when the marginal cost differential is 
“significantly large” or when the domestic firm cannot afford cost-reducing investments, its 
foreign competitor is able to dominate the market without running the risk of being charged with 
an AD fine.  In this case, filling an AD petition is ineffective.   
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a simple model of 
duopolistic competition to analyze strategic interactions between home and foreign firms under 
an AD law.  We discuss possible equilibrium outcomes of the Nash equilibrium and examine the 
conditions under which AD policy increases domestic profits.  In Section 3, we discuss 
implications of the model regarding the home firm’s incentives in undertaking cost-reducing 
R&D under an AD law, relative to the case without the law.  We also examine possible effects on 
domestic consumer surplus when the home firm may or may not invest in cost-reducing activities.  
Section 4 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model   
2.1 Basic Assumptions 
We present a simple model of duopolistic competition in an import-competing market under an 
AD law.  Our aim is to analyze how differences in production efficiency between home and 
foreign firms (in terms of marginal cost differential) affect the home firm’s profitability in filing 
an AD petition.  We assume that there is one firm located in each country, producing a 
homogeneous product.  The home country’s government implements an AD law and is 
committed to enforce the law.  We use variable I   to represent whether the foreign firm is 
accused and convicted of an AD violation.  When  1, I   an AD order is placed on the good 
produced by the foreign firm and the firm is charged with an AD duty.  Otherwise,  0. I   
  If the foreign firm is convicted of an AD violation, the firm has to pay fines based on the 
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                                      (1) 
where   is the “normal value” of the foreign import and  p  is market price of the product.  As in 
Pauwels et. al. (2001) and Evenett (2006), we assume that    is exogenously given and is 
common knowledge to both firms and the home country government. 
Let q and 
* q  represent the quantities of the competing good produced by home and foreign 
firms, respectively.  Market demand in the home country is taken to be linear:  , PaQ   where 
) (
* q q Q    is total consumption of the good and the positive parameter a (> 0) captures the 
good’s market size.  We assume that the home firm’s marginal cost is constant at c and the 
foreign firm’s marginal cost is constant at 
*, c  where 
*. cc 
4  This assumption indicates that the 
                                                 
4 Miyagiwa and Ohno (2007) present an interesting model to show that a foreign firm dumps because it possesses a 
new production technology.  The authors argue that dumping may turn out to be a signal of innovation.   3
foreign firm is more efficient in production than the home firm. 
The operating profits for the home and foreign firms are given, respectively, as 
       () aQc q                         (2)  
and 
** * * () ( , ) , aQcq I pq                                         (3) 
where   is dumping margin (see eq. (1)) and  ( , ) I p   takes on the value of 1 or zero.  That is,  
0 ;
(, )
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                                       (4) 
For the case in which  0, I   there will be no AD charges against the foreign firm so that there is 
free trade.  But for the case in which  1, I    the foreign firm is convicted of an AD violation 
because the good’s market price is below its normal value.  Consequently, the foreign firm is 
charged with a fine equal to 
*. q       
 
2.2 Optimal Output Decisions of the Firms 
We assume that both the home and foreign firms employ a Cournot strategy in their production 
decisions.  For analytical simplicity, we normalize 
* c   to zero and interpret  ( 0) c   as  the 
marginal cost differential between the home and foreign firms.     
  Maximizing the home firm’s profit in equation (2) with respect to  , q  we derive the 
firm’s output reaction function:  
*





                               (5) 
As for the foreign firm’s reaction function, it depends crucially on the dumping margin as 
specified in equation (1) and whether the home government places any AD order on the foreign 
product as defines in equation (4).  Maximizing the foreign firm’s profit in equation (3) with 
respect to 
* q , subject to these constrained conditions, we derive the following reaction function: 
             
*
          ,
2
( ; )               ,
22









   

    




                           (6) 
where  2 qa    and  3 / 2. qa       We assume that  / 2 a    which  guarantees  0 q   and 
0. q     This assumption is plausible since it implies that the product’s normal value ( )   is lower 
than its monopoly price ( / 2). a   Due to the dumping-margin constraint and the home 
government’s AD actions, the foreign firm’s reaction function has three components as shown in 
equation (6).  It is instructive to use a graphical approach to explain the constrained conditions 
and the resulting reaction function. 
First, we need to show the graphical interpretation of the dumping-margin constraint (see 
equation (1)).  When the foreign firm produces at a level such that the equilibrium market price   4
of the good equals its normal value, i.e.,  , p    no AD fines will be charged to the firm.  It 
follows from equation (1) and the linear demand function that 
*. aqq       Under the 
assumption that the normal value is exogenously given, we have   0 d   and 
* 1. dq dq     In 
Figure 1, line  ' AA  with a slope of minus one illustrates this case.  Line  ' AA  can thus be referred 
to as the “zero-dumping-margin line.”   If the total output level of the home and foreign firms 
occurs at a point outside the  ' AA  line, the foreign firm violates the law.  In this case, the firm is 
charged with an amount of the AD fine equal to the dumping margin,  ( 0), p     times the 
quantity of the foreign good dumped in the domestic market.  If, instead, the total output level of 

















Next we show the graphical interpretations of AD actions by the home government and 
the resulting output decisions by the foreign firm.  When there are no dumping charges so that 
0, I   the foreign firm’s reaction function is given by line  ' BB .    This is exactly the case under 
free trade.  Line  ' BB  and the zero-dumping-margin line  ' AA  determine a critical point F  such 
that the foreign firm does not violate an AD law when producing at any point over the segment 
. BF   The critical level of the domestic output at point F  is  . q   When there is an AD charge 
against the foreign firm (i.e.,  1 I  ), the foreign firm’s reaction function shifts leftward to the one 
as shown by line  ' CC .  Line  ' CC  and the zero-dumping-margin line  ' AA  determine another 
critical point M  such that the foreign firm violates the AD law when producing at a point on 
'. MC   The critical level of the domestic output at point M  is  . q    Thus, if the home firm’s output 
is “low” (qq  ) or “moderate” (qqq   ), the foreign firm responds by producing at a point 
over  BF  or  FM  without being charged with an AD fine.  But if the home firm’s output is 
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Figure 1.  The foreign firm’s reaction function and Nash equilibrium  
                  when the marginal cost differential is high, moderate, or low   5
sells its product at a price below the normal value and is subject to an AD fine.  Thus, the foreign 
firm’s reaction curve has three components as shown by  . BFMC     
We are now in a position to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the import-competing 
market.  To do so, we use the reaction functions in (5) and (6) to solve for the equilibrium 
outputs of the home and foreign firms as follows: 
2
3
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We then calculate the product’s market equilibrium price:  



































                     (9) 
It follows from equations (7)-(9) that the equilibrium outcomes differ in terms of 
differences in production efficiency between the two firms as reflected by their marginal cost 
differential.  For the purpose of our analysis, we show three possible scenarios in Figure 1.  
When the marginal cost differential is “high,” “moderate,” or “low,” the home firm’s reaction 
curve is given by  ,  , hm R R or   l R , respectively.  Nash equilibrium outputs of the firms then occur 
at , , hm  or  , l  respectively.  It comes as no surprise that under Cournot competition the optimal 
outputs of the two competing firms are strategic substitutes. The equilibrium points h and m  
indicate that the foreign firm does not violate an AD law since they are lying either inside or on 
the zero-dumping-margin line  '. AA   An equilibrium point like l is where the foreign firm sells 
the product at a price below its normal value and hence is subject to an AD duty. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, when the home firm’s output is equal to or lower than q , 
the foreign firm is capable of selling its product with a relatively high market share along line 
. BF   In this case, the foreign firm is not vulnerable to any AD charge.  The reason is that the 
home firm is a high-cost firm and its ability to put the foreign rival in the situation of an illegal 
dumping is limited.  When the home firm’s output is greater than q  but is less than q  , foreign 
output along line FB will result in an AD charge.  The question of interest is: what would be the 
foreign firm’s strategy in exports?  To answer this question, we find that there are two   6
possibilities depending on the level of output produced by the home firm.  The first possibility is 
when the home firm’s output is at a level over the range of qqq   .  The foreign firm chooses 
to produce at a point along the line segment of  . FM   Since  FM  is part of line  A A  , there 
involves no AD violations.  The second possibility is when the home firm’s output is relatively 
large so that qq  .  Interestingly, the foreign firm may simply pay fines by selling its product 
along the MC segment.  This situation arises when the market share of the home firm is large 
relative to that of the foreign firm’s. 
The graphical analysis indicates that, given a product’s normal value, whether a foreign 
firm will be convicted of an AD violation depends crucially on the marginal cost differential.  We 
show in Proposition 1 that there is a critical level of marginal cost differential below which the 
foreign firm is convicted of illegal dumping. 
PROPOSITION 1. Whether a foreign firm will be charged with a dumping violation depends on 
the marginal cost differential (or the relative efficiency in production) between home and foreign 
firms.  If the marginal cost differential is “significantly small,” the home firm is able to increase 
its output and lower the product price, causing the foreign firm at the situation of violating an 
AD law.  In this case, the home firm has an economic incentive to file an AD petition against its 
foreign competitor.  Moreover, the market share of the home firm is greater than 50%.  
Proof: See A-1 in the Appendix. ■ 
This proposition indicates that the more efficient the home firm is in production, the 
greater its incentive to file an AD petition, and the higher the likelihood that its foreign 
competitor will be selling a product at a price below its normal value. 
Based on the above analytical framework, we find that marginal cost differential between 
home and foreign firms plays a key factor in determining (i) a domestic industry’s market share 
in the face of foreign competition and (ii) whether the foreign firm sells its product at a price 
below the product’s normal value.  Proposition 1 implies that, given the normal value of an 
imported good, a domestic firm whose market share is significantly large tends to file petition for 
an AD investigation against its foreign rival.  This finding is consistent with the analysis of 
Collie and Vandenbussche (2006).  The authors examine the incentive for U.S. industries to file 
an AD petition under the Byrd Amendment and find that an industry has a strong   
incentive to file an AD petition when its market share exceeds 50%. 
With respect to the effect on domestic profits, we have  
PROPOSITION 2.  When the marginal cost differential between home and foreign firms is 
moderate or small, domestic profits are higher under the AD law than under free trade, 
regardless of whether or not the foreign firm is convicted of an illegal dumping. 
Proof:  See A-2 in the Appendix. ■ 
Reitzes (1993) presents a two-period model of duopoly and finds that adjustment in 
domestic production in period one can strategically put a foreign firm at the risk of an AD 
violation.  In our one-period analysis, we pay particular attention to the aspect of marginal cost 
differential in affecting whether an imported product is dumped at a price below its normal value.  
In other words, production technology is an important factor in determining the profitability of a 
home firm in filing a successful AD charge against its foreign competitor.     
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3. Cost-Reducing Activities and an AD Law 
In this section, we discuss implications of the model regarding the home firm’s incentive to 
invest in cost-reducing activities that lower its marginal cost under an AD law.  We will show 
that, relative to the case without an AD law, it is more profitable for the home firm to lower the 






















Recall that we examine three possible scenarios for the home firm’s reaction function 
when its marginal cost is high( ), h c  moderate ( ), m c  or low ( ). l c   Consider the case where the 
home producer is initially a high-cost firm ( h c ) such that its reaction curve is  h R .  In the absence 
of an AD law, the foreign firm’s reaction curve is  ' BB  and the free trade equilibrium occurs at h.  
Suppose that by undertaking a certain level of cost-reducing activities, the home firm is able to 
lower the marginal cost differential from  h c  to  m c .  This generates a rightward shift in the home 
firm’s reaction curve from  h R  to  m R .  Consequently, the free trade equilibrium changes from 
point h to point  '. m   For evaluating the profitability of the cost-reducing activities for the home 
firm, we compare domestic profits between m and  . h   We first draw a hypothetical line passing 
through point h which is parallel to line  ' AA  of the 45-degree right triangle, 0' AA .  We then 
draw a horizontal line passing through m .  The hypothetical line and the horizontal line 
intercept at point  . a   Since h and a are on the same line parallel to segment  ' AA  of the right 
triangle, the aggregate output levels at h and a are exactly identical, that is, 
* *
a a h h q q q q    .  
So will the product’s market price at these two points, i.e., 
a h p p  .  It follows that when the 
marginal cost differential is as high as  h c , the home firm’s profit is lower at h than at a.  That is, 
() () .
ha
hh cc     At point  , a  domestic profit is higher when the marginal cost differential is 
lower, other things being equal.  That is,  () () .
aa
hm cc     When the marginal cost differential is 
C  








Figure 2.  Incentives of the home firm in undertaking cost-reducing R&D 
* q  
h R   m R   l R  
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reduced from  h c  to  m c  because of investment in cost-reducing activities, the home firm’s profit 
is higher at  ' m  than at a.  That is,  ( ) ( ).
am
mm cc 
    Taking together all these results, we have  
() () () () .
haa m
hhm m ccc c 
                   (10) 
  In the presence of the AD law, the foreign firm’s reaction curve is  ' BFMC as shown in 
the previous section.  Nash equilibrium can occur at a point like m  for a high-cost domestic firm 
if cost-reducing investment allows the firm to shift its reaction curve rightward from  h R  to  . m R  




                     ( 1 1 )  
From equations (10) and (11), it follows that    
  
' () () () .
hm m
hm m ccc                     ( 1 2 )  
Apparently, the home firm has an economic incentive to invest in cost-reducing activities, 
regardless of where or not there is an AD law.  But for a given level of cost-reducing investment, 
the increase in domestic profit turns out to be relatively higher in the presence of an AD law. 
The same line of reasoning can be used to analyze the case where the home firm is 
initially a medium-cost firm ( m c ) with the reaction curve  m R .  As shown in Figure 2, the firm 
may want to lower the marginal cost differential and shift its reaction curve from  m R  to  l R  
through cost-reducing R&D.  To see this, we draw two hypothetical lines: (i)  ' , mb which is 
parallel to line ha, and (ii)  ' , lb which is parallel to line  '. ma  It is easy to verify that  
( ) ( ) () () () .
mb b l l
mmlll ccc c c    
    
This indicates that, irrespective of whether or not there is an AD law, the medium-cost home 
firm has a strong incentive to undertake cost-reducing investment.  Nevertheless, such cost-
reducing investment generates a relatively higher profit for the home firm under the protection of 
an AD law.  Interestingly, the foreign firm is in the situation of a dumping violation because the 
product’s equilibrium market price is lower than its normal value. 
It should be noted that if cost-reducing activities’ start-up costs (denoted as  ) F  are 
“large,” we cannot rule out the following possibilities:   
() () () ()
mh m h
mh mh cc F cc  
    or  () ( ) () ( ) .
lm l m
lm lm cc F cc  
      
These inequalities imply that investment in cost-reducing activities can be unprofitable to the 
home firm under free trade, but is profitable in the case with an AD law. 
The findings of the analyses are summarized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3. Compared to the case without an AD law, the home firm has a stronger 
incentive to undertake cost-reducing activities under the law and may put its foreign rival in the 
risk of a dumping violation. 
Finally, it is instructive to see how the home firm’s cost-reducing investment affects 
domestic consumers under an AD law.  We have  
PROPOSITION 4.. Domestic consumers may be better off under an AD law when the home 
firm further undertakes cost-reducing activities sufficiently enough to lower its marginal cost of 
production, other things being equal.   9
Proof: See A-3 in the Appendix.  ■ 
It is generally held that the imposition of an AD law benefits domestic firms at the 
expense of domestic consumers since the product’s market price will go up.  In the absence of an 
AD law, domestic consumers are unambiguously better off when a foreign import is dumped at a 
price below its normal value.  Our analysis shows that if the home firm is able to significantly 
lower its production cost through investment in cost-reducing activities, consumer surplus may 
increase despite the presence of an AD law. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we present a simple model of duopolistic competition between domestic and 
foreign firms in the home market under AD policy.  We show conditions under which the 
domestic firm is able to strategically adjust its production in order to put its foreign rival in the 
risk of an AD violation.  These situations arise when AD enforcement is effective and the 
marginal cost differential between the two firms is significantly small.  The increase in domestic 
production lowers the price of the import below its normal value, causing the foreign firm to 
violate an AD law.      
Given the normal value of a product as common knowledge, a domestic producer’s 
technology plays a role in affecting whether its foreign rival will be convicted of illegal dumping.  
We find that a home firm has a stronger incentive to undertake cost-reducing activities under an 
AD law.
5  Interestingly, domestic consumers can be better off when the home firm further invest 
in cost-reducing activities.  But for the case in which the marginal cost differential is 
“significantly large,” the foreign firm is able to dominate the market without violating an AD law.  
Filling an AD petition is ineffective.  Our analysis helps identify the types of domestic firms that 
tend to file petition or the likelihood that the petition is successful or not.
 6 
 
                                                 
5 Because we focus on the home firm’s incentives to file an AD petition and the profitability of investment in cost-
reducing activities resulting from an AD law, we do not examine R&D game between the home and foreign firms.  
For issues on how R&D activities are affected by the imposition of an AD law by a single country or by two trading 
nations, see the interesting study by Gao and Miyagiwa (2005).   
6 As we focus on incentive to file an AD petition, we follow Reitzes (1993), Anderson, Schmitt, and Thisse (1995), 
and Collie and Le (2008) in modeling AD issues without considering injury margin.   Another reason that we only 
consider the dumping margin is because of the assumption of homogenous products.  A more complete analysis 
should consider both dumping margin and injury margin.  According to AD regulation set by GATT/WTO, a 
successful AD case against a foreign firm requires both foreign dumping and material injuries to be well 
documented.  An import is being dumped or sold at “less fair value” when a foreign firm charges a higher price in its 
own market than in its export market, or when the firm sells its product at a price below production cost.  A 
determination of injury shall be made only if the dumped import is causing material injury to an established 
domestic industry.  A number of injury indicators are checked which include import volume, capacity utilization, 
profits, employment, market share, and the evolution of domestic prices.  Vermulst and Waer (1991) provide a 
detailed measurement in calculating injury margin, which is often modeled as the difference between foreign 
product price in the domestic market and the price of a similar product also in the domestic market (see, e.g., 
Pauwels, Vandenbussche, and Weverbergh (2001)).  For an interesting empirical study on injury margins, see 
Tharakan, Greenaway, and Kerstens. (2006). 
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Appendix  
This appendix contains proofs of some propositions discussed in the main body of the paper. 
A-1. Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove the first part of Proposition 1, we define the critical level of the marginal cost 
differential as  (5 2 ) 2.
A ca     It follows directly from the price equation in (9) that if 
A cc   
the market equilibrium price is below its normal value, causing the foreign firm to be violating 
an AD law.  To prove the second part of Proposition 1, we use output equations in (7) and (8) to 
calculate for the case of a significantly low marginal cost differential (i.e.,  (5 2) ca   ) the 

























denominator of the fraction on the right hand side of the above equation is strictly positive since 
* () ( 4 2 ) / 6 0 . qq a c      To prove that the market share is greater than 50%, it suffices to 
show that  2. c     Given the marginal cost differential condition that  (5 2) , ca   we have 
522 ac  .  Since the product’s normal value ()    is lower than the monopoly price 
(/ 2 ) a such that  2, a    we have 2222 . ac c     It follows from the above two inequalities 
that 5 2 2 4 2 , ac c    which further implies that  2 . c     We thus have  50%. s   ■ 
 
A-2. Proof of Proposition 2 
We use Figure 1 to prove this proposition.  In the absence of an AD law, free trade equilibrium 
occurs at  , h , m  and l when the marginal cost differential is high, moderate, or low, respectively.  
For the three possibilities of marginal cost differential, the equilibrium occurs at  , h ', m  and  ' l , 
respectively, in the presence of an AD law.  Given that  ' m  lies to the southeast of m on the same 
reaction curve  m R  and that  ' l  lies to the southeast of lon the same reaction curve  l R , it follows 
immediately that 
mm  
   and  .
ll  
   ■ 
 
A-3. Proof of Proposition 4 
We use Figure 2 to prove this proposition.  Assume that the initial equilibrium occurs at point h 
in the absence of an AD law (that is, there is free trade).  After an AD law has been implemented, 
other things being equal, the equilibrium remains unchanged at point h and there is no change in 
consumer surplus.  If the home firm further invests in cost-reducing activities such that its 
reaction curve shifts from  h R to  m R , the equilibrium changes from h  to  . m   Investigation of 
Figure 3 reveals that  the aggregate output level is greater at m  than at h, i.e.,  .
mh QQ   Since 
,
mh p p   consumer surplus is relatively higher at  . m   Next, assume that the initial equilibrium 
occurs at m under free trade.  If the home firm does not invest in cost-reducing activities, the 
imposition of an AD law shifts the equilibrium from m to m .  But if the home firm further 
undertakes cost-reducing investment, the equilibrium may change from m to a point like  . l   As 
illustrated in Figure 2, an extension of line  ' mb  intersects the  ' MC  segment of the foreign firm’s 
reaction function at point  . g   If l is lying to the southeast of  , g  the aggregate output level is 
greater at l  than  at  ' m .  That is, 
' lm QQ  .  Since 
',
lm p p    consumer surplus is relatively 
higher at a point like  . l  ■   11
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